Against the Agnosticism-Argument for Value-Freedom

Abstract

Criticisms of the value-free ideal often proceed on the basis of underdetermination theses, arguing that empirical evidence and cognitive values are not (always) sufficient to determine theory choice, wherefore other values came to bear on such choices. A common strategy against such criticisms can be found in what I call the agnosticism-argument. It claims that, first, not all theory assessment is permanently underdetermined. Second, in cases where theory assessment is currently underdetermined, the epistemically correct reaction is to stay agnostic until further evidence is given: Theory assessment should be postponed rather than made dependent on non-cognitive values. I will question this second point and argue that agnosticism is not a successful defence of the value-free ideal against the problem of (transient) underdetermination. The agnosticism-argument fails because not all epistemically relevant decisions can possibly be postponed or determined by further evidence. Ultimately, this proves fatal for the ideal of value-freedom itself, since even a complete adherence to its prescriptions can lead to value-laden results.