Order-revealing encryption (ORE) is a primitive for outsourcing encrypted databases which allows for efficiently performing range queries over encrypted data. Unfortunately, a series of works, starting with Naveed et al. (CCS 2015), have shown that when the adversary has a good estimate of the distribution of the data, ORE provides little protection. In this work, we consider the case that the database entries are drawn identically and independently from a distribution of known shape, but for which the mean and variance are not (and thus the attacks of Naveed et al. do not apply). We define a new notion of security for ORE, called parameter-hiding ORE, which maintains the secrecy of these parameters. We give a construction of ORE satisfying our new definition from bilinear maps.
CITATION STYLE
Cash, D., Liu, F. H., O’Neill, A., Zhandry, M., & Zhang, C. (2018). Parameter-hiding order revealing encryption. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11272 LNCS, pp. 181–210). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03326-2_7
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.