The War About the War: Iraq and the Politics of National Security Advising in the G.W. Bush Administration's First Term

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which the management system and foreign policy advisory structures of the George W. Bush Administration led the president to launch the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. We contend that the decision to attack Iraq was an outgrowth of the conflict that began when the administration's national security team was assembled after Bush's electoral victory and was a by-product of the president's management style. We devote significant attention to the internal battles surrounding the decision for war between those who believe in a traditional multilateral approach (realists) to world politics and those who believe in a Pax Americana built on unilateralism (neocons). The article concludes that in addition to the way President Bush organized the decision-making process, his propensity for delegating responsibility to others combined with policy making structures built largely on consensus and personality factors, as opposed to procedures and processes, ultimately drove the White House toward the use of military force in Iraq. © 2017 Wiley. All rights reserved.