The New Enlightenment and Academic Inquiry

Abstract

We need to get clear about the implications for academic inquiry of correcting the blunders we have inherited from the 18th century Enlightenment—so that the basic Enlightenment idea can be put properly into practice. We take two conceptions of scientific method in turn. First, we adopt Karl Popper’s falsificationist conception of scientific method. When this is generalized and applied to the task of helping to solve problems of living, including global problems, the implications for academia as a whole are that problems of living are put at the heart of academic inquiry, the basic intellectual tasks being to improve articulation of problems of living, and to propose and critically assess possible solutions—possible social, political actions. The scientific pursuit of knowledge would be important but secondary. Public education about what our problems are, and what we need to do to solve them, becomes a basic objective of academia. Second, we adopt the much improved conception of scientific method of aim-oriented empiricism, which recognizes that problematic metaphysical assumptions are inherent in the aims of science, and provides a meta-methodology for the improvement of the aims and methods of science as science proceeds. This is generalized so that it applies fruitfully, potentially, to all worthwhile human endeavours with problematic aims. It is then the task of social inquiry and the humanities to get this aims-and-methods improving meta-methodology into the fabric of social life, into all our other social endeavours besides science. Social inquiry becomes social methodology, not primarily social science. The basic aim of academic inquiry becomes, not just to acquire knowledge, but rather to seek and promote wisdom—wisdom being construed as the capacity, active endeavour and desire to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom thus conceived including knowledge and technological know-how, but much besides.