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Leakage resilience against concurrent cache attacks

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (2014) 8414 LNCS 140-158
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-54792-8_8
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Abstract

In this paper we show how to engineer proofs of security for software implementations of leakage-resilient cryptosystems on execution platforms with concurrency and caches. The proofs we derive are based on binary executables of the cryptosystem and on simple but realistic models of microprocessors. © 2014 Springer-Verlag.

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APA

Barthe, G., Köpf, B., Mauborgne, L., & Ochoa, M. (2014). Leakage resilience against concurrent cache attacks. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 8414 LNCS, pp. 140–158). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54792-8_8

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