The role of “legitimacy,” hadi, and the islah party

Abstract

After President Saleh’s overthrow in 2011, a de facto alliance emerged between interim President Hadi and leaders of the Islah party: namely, sons of the late Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussain al-Ahmar and the unrelated General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar. Until the early 2000s, these men had been key allies of former President Saleh. But in 2011, they were instrumental in pushing Saleh from power. As political tensions grew among them in 2012 and 2013, Hadi apparently decided that his de facto allies posed a challenge to his authority. In early 2014, he began using indirect means to weaken them by allowing Houthi rebels to attack their bases of power. In July 2014, Hadi failed to send military assistance when Houthi rebels assaulted a major army base under the control of General al-Ahmar’s key ally in Amran. This opened the door for Houthi rebels to stage a coup d’état with Saleh’s help in September, leading to Hadi’s resignation in January 2015. Despite deep fissures in their relationship, Hadi and Islah leaders reconstituted a fragile alliance after the Saudi-led war started in March 2015. Known as the “Legitimacy” group, they sustained their alliance during long years of warfare between 2015 and 2019 due to a shared dependency on Saudi Arabia, where President Hadi resided in exile, and a deep distrust of the roles played by the UN and Western governments.