Power Imbalance in Africa-China Investment and Development Deals: The Case of Zimbabwe (2000–2018)

Abstract

This paper seeks to flag the reality of the socio-economic impact of power imbalance in the negotiation and implementation of infrastructural projects constructed in Zimbabwe and funded by China Exim Bank, China’s main financial arm in Africa. Reviewing the China-Zimbabwe financial deals concluded during President Mugabe’s regime from 2000 to 2018, I use existing credible online-available data and draw on analysis conducted in the framework of a PhD study carried out between 2019 and 2020. I argue that China had an overriding negotiating upper hand in these deals, which limited the economic and social gains that Zimbabwe could expect—and could obtain—from the bilateral relations. The mobilization of financial resources and popular disapproval of Chinese-led projects constitute the biggest obstacles to the efficient implementation of infrastructure development in the country. The paper underlines that the Zimbabwean population has borne the brunt, on one hand, of the predatory attitude of Chinese contractors, and on the other, of the irresponsibility of the Zimbabwean government, unable so far to formulate policies that enhance debt sustainability or to take action on citizen grievances, such as underpayment and maltreatment at the hands of the Chinese contractors. The discussion highlights how much, in the case of China-Africa relations, the ideal goal of mutual benefit for each State involved in bilateral investment agreements falls short of expectations.