Receiving “Corporate Compliance” in Latin America

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Abstract

International treaties and transnational practices suggest convergence around a model for preventing and prosecuting corporate crime based, among other features, on corporate liability, incentives for corporations to prevent corruption through the implementation of compliance programs and internal controls, and incentives offered to individuals and corporations to supply evidence to prove the offence and/or to recover the proceeds of the crime, in exchange for lenient sanctions or even immunity. The institutions required to implement this enforcement model were, until recently, absolutely alien to Latin American legal systems. Nevertheless, in an unprecedented shift, the leading Latin American economies introduced corporate liability regimes and incentives for preventing, policing, self-reporting, and remedying corporate crime, particularly corruption offences. This chapter analyzes how these legal institutions are being received and adapted to Latin America’s legal and institutional landscapes.

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Jorge, G. (2021). Receiving “Corporate Compliance” in Latin America. In Corporate Compliance on a Global Scale: Legitimacy and Effectiveness (pp. 115–137). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81655-1_6

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