Immunity to error through misidentification (IEM), ‘de se’ and pragmatic intrusion: A linguistic treatment

Abstract

In this paper, I defend the idea that pragmatic intrusion is involved in ‘de se’ constructions: the ego-concept being a component of the ‘de se’ thought. I defend this idea from a number of objections. I explore the related notion of immunity to error through misidentification and I claim that this too depends on pragmatic intrusion. I defend this view from obvious objections. I take immunity to error through misidentification in ‘de se’ thoughts to depend on the fact that the thinking subject makes an implicit use of the first-person pronominal and there is no question of attributing a referent to the pronominal, since the referent is given in the subject of the thought. In third-person ‘de se’ attributions, some form of simulation can be used to reconstruct the thinking subject as using a form of the first-person pronominal. Immunity to error through misidentification is attributed to the thinking subject through simulation.