I think i voted: E-voting vs. democracy

Abstract

Touch-screen voting machines store records of cast votes in internal memory, where the voter cannot check them. Because of our system of secret ballots, once the voter leaves the polls there is no way anyone can determine whether the vote captured was what the voter intended. Why should voters trust these machines? In January 2003, I drafted a "Resolution on Electronic Voting" stating that every voting system should have a "voter verifiable audit trail," which is a permanent record of the vote that can be checked for accuracy by the voter, and which is saved for a recount if it is required. I posted the page with endorsements from many prominent computer scientists. At that point, I became embroiled in a nationwide battle for voting transparency that has continued now for three years. In this talk, I'll explain the basic problems and solutions in electronic voting. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.