The aim of this paper is to connect Leibniz's and Toulmin's conceptions about practical and deliberative rationality. When trying to rationally justify contingent judgments Leibniz, like Toulmin, defends a weighing argumentative method. Thus, in Leibniz we can discern the balance between the legitimate demands of formal models of rationality and the lessons of a practice "situated on a historical, social, and evaluative context (theoria cum praxi). © 2006 Springer.
CITATION STYLE
Ausín, T. (2006). The quest for rationalism without Dogmas in Leibniz and Toulmin. In Arguing on the Toulmin Model: New Essays in Argument Analysis and Evaluation (pp. 261–272). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4938-5_17
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