Indirect reciprocity with simple records

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Abstract

Indirect reciprocity is a foundational mechanism of human cooperation. Existing models of indirect reciprocity fail to robustly support social cooperation: Image-scoring models fail to provide robust incentives, while social-standing models are not informationally robust. Here we provide a model of indirect reciprocity based on simple, decentralized records: Each individual's record depends on the individual's own past behavior alone, and not on the individual's partners' past behavior or their partners' partners' past behavior. When social dilemmas exhibit a coordination motive (or strategic complementarity), tolerant trigger strategies based on simple records can robustly support positive social cooperation and exhibit strong stability properties. In the opposite case of strategic substitutability, positive social cooperation cannot be robustly supported. Thus, the strength of short-run coordination motives in social dilemmas determines the prospects for robust long-run cooperation.

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Clark, D., Fudenberg, D., & Wolitzky, A. (2020). Indirect reciprocity with simple records. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 117(21). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1921984117

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