Rules in dialogue

Abstract

This chapter returns to some of the foundational issues discussed in the introduction and first chapter, particularly regarding the justification of logical rules. In Chaps. 1 and 2, I argued that standard inferentialist accounts do not suffice to provide justification of basic logical rules. In response, an analysis of logical inference as acts taking place in dialogical situations is provided, by taking interactions to be structured around moves that may be defined as coherent under certain circumstances. This is used to underpin a novel account of the proof-theoretic notion of harmony as a way of balancing moves. I show that this leads to a constructive logic over both proofs and refutations, where logical rules are justfied internally, at the termination of dialogue. This means that, rather than start with logical rules a priori, the rules themselves are derivative of dialogical balance, so we can reconstruct certain logical rules subsequent to interaction. I finish by discussing the relationships between the formal structure presented here, and related structures.