Theory and Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First Century: The Limits of Realism

Abstract

IntroductIon Will the spread of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century threaten international peace and world order, or will proliferation be contained, and the risk of nuclear war controlled, with as much success as in the preceding century? The optimistic arguments, relatively more acceptant of nuclear weapons spread, have been based at least partly on realist international systems theory (RIST) and rational deterrence theory (RDT). Against these arguments favorable to proliferation, skeptics have contended that nuclear proliferation is more to be feared than welcomed. The proliferation pessimists base some of their stronger arguments on organizational theory as it applies to nuclear crisis management, and on the technical and procedural constraints related to the operation of nuclear forces. 1 Of course, in any academic and policy debates, there are schools-within-schools and nuances within subplots. 2 But the important fault line is that between those who are convinced that nuclear weapons spread is compatible , more or less, with international stability, and those who are equally concerned that nuclear proliferation raises the risks of inadvertent war or deliberate nuclear attack. This chapter considers the assumptions made about RIST and RDT in this debate and asks whether these assumptions are robust with regard to the issue of nuclear proliferation. If the assumptions about RIST and rational deterrence theory are not as convincing as hitherto assumed, the character of the debate between the proliferation-acceptant and the proliferation-resistant schools may need rethinking.