Epistocracy Within Public Reason

Abstract

Epistocracy—a political system in which formal political power is distributed on the basis of expertise—may produce better outcomes than democ-racy. Yet, David Estlund contends that epistocracy is incompatible with public rea-son liberalism. This essay argues that, contrary to Estlund, epistocracy can be justifi ed within public reason, even if, as Estlund argues, reasonable people cannot all agree on just what constitutes political expertise or who the experts are. 14.1 Why Not Epistocracy? David Estlund says, " …removing the right issues from democratic control and turn-ing them over to the right experts would lead to better political decisions, and more justice and prosperity " (Estlund 2008 , 262). Why not support epistocracy? The most important objection to epistocracy is the Objection from Public Reason : Epistocracy violates the liberal principle of legitimacy, which holds that coercive political regimes and polices are legitimate and authoritative only if there are no reasonable objec-tions to that regime or those policies, and if all reasonable people subject to coercion have conclusive grounds for accepting that regime or those policies. (Estlund 2008 , 262).