Blindfolded in the Dark. The Intelligence Position of Dutchbat in the Srebrenica Safe Area

Abstract

The attack on and the full conquest of the Safe Area of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 caught everyone by surprise. This did not only go for Dutchbat, but for all intelligence services concerned. This cannot merely be explained by the fact that it was just shortly before the attack on the enclave that the Bosnian Serbs took the decision to conquer it completely, but it also has to do with the extremely weak intelligence position of the UN and with the absence of sufficient capacity and the right means to gather and analyse intelligence. Because of this, the fall of Srebrenica can be attributed to the failure of military intelligence. The Netherlands can be blamed as well. In the Dutch cabinet, in the Dutch Army and in Parliament an anti-intelligence attitude prevailed. Among them the idea had taken root that a peacekeeping operation did not require intelligence. Dutchbat command made serious mistakes and did not seize all available opportunities improve the intelligence position inside the enclave.