Conditional intent in the strange case of murder by logic

Abstract

It appears logically innocuous say that 'if C occurs, then I will probably do A'. The proposition nevertheless gives rise to an apparent paradox if it is independently true that I will probably not do A. I consider the case in which I commit myself to the conditional statement of intent whereby if someone in the prison does not murder the hated warden by a certain time, then I will probably do so, where in fact I do not really have it in my character or a likely opportunity to commit the murder. It follows then simply by modus tollendo tollens that someone else will in fact murder the warden by the appointed time. Since logic and my conditional oath alone cannot bring about the warden's death, there must be some deeper problem in the proposition. I suggest that the paradox arises because of an equivocation on two sources of probability assessments in the statement of conditional intent and in the independent judgment whereby it is unlikely that I will kill the warden, and that when these sources are disambiguated the paradox does not arise. The disambiguation of distinct sources of probability judgment is justified more generally by its usefulness in avoiding a variety of distantly related paradoxes.