Conclusions and Further Directions

Abstract

Many animals, including mammals and some birds, are minimal, self-aware agents, and autonomous beings that are deserving of direct moral consideration. As research into animal minds continues, we will gain more understanding of the specific mental capacities that constitute selfhood, and this can be used to better gauge the specific ways we can respect autonomy in various individuals and species. Although challenges exist in interpreting animal behaviours correctly to make inferences about the animals’ experiences, too much scepticism that results in the denial of animal selfhood is unwarranted. An empirically informed theory of animal ethics is the best way to support the inclusion of animals in the moral community. In this book, I have argued for a view of agency and selfhood that is more or less complex, depending on the mental capacities for rationality and intentionality found within individual animals and species. I supported this view with evidence from scientific research into animal minds, and also with arguments based on the evolutionary continuity of animal species. I further argued that, based on animal agency and self-awareness, most animals are also autonomous, and that provides us with reasons to respect an individual’s ability to value their subjective experiences and control their own behaviour. A view which holds that animals and humans are divided into separate moral categories cannot be maintained given my view of selfhood and autonomy as existing on an evolutionary continuum.