Practical cryptanalysis of SFLASH

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a practical attack on the signature scheme SFLASH proposed by Patarin, Goubin and Courtois in 2001 following a design they had introduced in 1998. The attack only needs the public key and requires about one second to forge a signature for any message, after a one-time computation of several minutes. It can be applied to both SFLASHv2 which was accepted by NESSIE, as well as to SFLASHv3 which is a higher security version. © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2007.

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Dubois, V., Fouque, P. A., Shamir, A., & Stern, J. (2007). Practical cryptanalysis of SFLASH. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4622 LNCS, pp. 1–17). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74143-5_1

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