Constrained preference elicitation

  • Azrieli Y
  • Chambers C
  • Healy P
1Citations
Citations of this article
8Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

This article is free to access.

Abstract

A planner wants to elicit information about an agent's preference relation, but not the entire ordering. Specifically, preferences are grouped into “types,” and the planner wants only to elicit the agent's type. We first assume that beliefs about randomization are subjective, and show that a space of types is elicitable if and only if each type is defined by what the agent would choose from some list of menus. If beliefs are objective, then additional type spaces can be elicited, though a convexity condition must be satisfied. These results remain unchanged when we consider a setting with multiple agents.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Azrieli, Y., Chambers, C. P., & Healy, P. J. (2021). Constrained preference elicitation. Theoretical Economics, 16(2), 507–538. https://doi.org/10.3982/te4208

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free