We consider a strategic game called project game where each agent has to choose a project among his own list of available projects. The model includes positive weights expressing the capacity of a given agent to contribute to a given project. The realization of a project produces some reward that has to be allocated to the agents. The reward of a realized project is fully allocated to its contributors, according to a simple proportional rule. Existence and computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria is addressed and their efficiency is investigated according to both the utilitarian and the egalitarian social function.
CITATION STYLE
Bilò, V., Gourvès, L., & Monnot, J. (2019). Project Games. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11485 LNCS, pp. 75–86). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17402-6_7
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