Demanding non-programmatic distribution: evidence from local governments in Chile

Abstract

Non-programmatic policies are usually analysed from the perspective of parties that rely on vote-buying, patronage, or pork-barrel, to distribute benefits and enhance their electoral performance. It is assumed that parties and politicians offer these particular distributions to citizens. This is not what happens at Chile’s sub-national level, however. There are no political machines in this country, so the citizens come to demand benefits from the mayor. Based on data from 50,099 formal meetings requested by citizens to mayors of the 345 Chilean municipalities, we show that when there is an absence of a party machine or patron that makes a top-down offer, it is the people who approach the authorities to demand resources. We conclude that, first, demands are primarily to claim for targeted distribution. Second, citizens who demand non-programmatic benefits are not part of organizations and do so particularly. Third, women are largely those who seek more targeted distribution. Fourth, the demands on mayors occur mostly in most rural comunas. Fifth, mayors who respond to these formal demands mainly do not mobilize intermediation networks.