Nonfallacious Rhetorical Design in Argumentation

Abstract

In previous papers I have argued that the traditional concepts of rhetorical strategy and argumentative fallacy are incompatible as they stand (Jacobs, 2000, 2002, 2005). Certain assumptions about strategy and fallacy block efforts to genuinely integrate logical and dialectical theories of argumentation with rhetorical theories. The problem arises from the traditional understanding of what can and should properly enter into achieving the goal of voluntary, informed consent. Both logical and dialectical theories of argumentation tend to equate this goal with decision-making that is based on “the merits of the case” according to “the force of the better argument” – and based on these considerations alone. When determining whether or not this standard has been properly upheld, logical evaluations tend to test directly the content and structure of the arguments that are made; dialectical approaches tend to evaluate the conduct and procedures by which the arguers themselves make and test their arguments.