“The Size of the Self”: Minimalist Selves and Narrative Self-Constitution

Abstract

This essay responds to skeptical queries directed against narrative by examining two views of the self in contemporary philosophical literature which can be traced back to two differing interpretations of Locke’s account of the relation between persons and selves. On the first (or “narrative self-constitution”) view, a persisting subject exists only by its (essentially, even if only implicitly, narrative) appropriation of different experiences over time. On the other (“minimalist”) view, selfhood is not something actively accomplished, but rather a (pre-reflective, pre-linguistic, pre-narrative) given of some sort, one that is shared not merely by self-conscious adult human beings but also by animals, children and the cognitively impaired; on this view, selfhood in this more restricted sense is a necessary precursor of, but not coextensive with, personhood, which requires in addition some form of higher-order cognition or reflection.