"Agents without Principals" Revisited: Theorizing the Effects of Increased Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance

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Jones, T. M., & Keevil, A. A. C. (2015). “Agents without Principals” Revisited: Theorizing the Effects of Increased Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance. In Shareholder Empowerment: A New Era in Corporate Governance (pp. 103–135). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137373939_5

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