Domesticated Eurocrats: Bureaucratic Discretion in the Legislative Pre-Negotiations of the European Union

Abstract

This article examines the discretionary power of national governments in EU policy making, focusing on the preparatory stage of European legislation. We assess the conditions under which the ministry in charge of the pre-negotiations is able to withstand attempts of domestic stakeholders to change the national bargaining stance. Our case studies and multivariate regressions on 15 legislative proposals show that the overall conflict between domestic stakeholders and pressure from powerful interest groups make such changes more likely. Parliamentary actors and parties do, conversely, not possess much power in these often technical deliberations. Although governments and their bureaucracies have to yield in some situations, they possess ample discretion in the average decision-making process. We illustrate our findings with a comparative case study on the controversial attempt by the Commission to regulate the usage of PVC softeners in toys.