Abstract
We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results in a mechanism that is strategyproof in expectation, and dominates the random dictator mechanism in terms of utilitarian social welfare. We further improve the upper bound for three agents on a circle to (Formula Presented) (whereas random dictator obtains (Formula Presented) ); and provide the first lower bounds for randomized strategyproof facility location in any metric space, using linear programming.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Meir, R. (2019). Strategyproof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11801 LNCS, pp. 18–33). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_2
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