Abduction, competing models and the virtues of hypotheses

Abstract

This paper focuses on abduction as explicit or readily formulatable inference to possible explanatory hypotheses—as contrasted with inference to conceptual innovations or abductive logic as a cycle of hypothesis, deduction of consequences and inductive testing. Inference to an explanation is often a matter of projection or extrapolation of elements of accepted theory for the solution of outstanding problems in particular domains of inquiry. I say, “projection or extrapolation” of accepted theory, but I mean to point to something broader and suggest how elements of accepted theory constrain emergent models and plausible inferences to explanations—in a quasi-rationalistic fashion. I draw illustrations from quantum gravity below just because there is so little direct evidence available in the field. It is in such cases that Peirce’s discussions of abduction provide the most plausible support for the idea of a logic of abduction—as inference to readily formulatable explanatory hypotheses. The possible need for conceptual innovation points to limits on the possibility of a logic of abduction of a more rationalistic character—selecting uniquely superior explanations. Abduction conceived as a repeating cycle of inquiry also points to limits on our expectations for an abductive logic. My chief point is that the character of inference to an explanation, viewed below as embedded within arguments from analogy, is so little compelling, as a matter of logical form alone, that there will always be a pluralism of plausible alternatives among untested hypotheses and inferences to them—calling for some comparative evaluation. This point will take us to some consideration of the virtues of hypotheses—as a description of the range of this pluralism.