Hilary Kornblith’s naturalised epistemology centrally involves the thesis that knowledge is a natural kind like water or aluminium. In his most recent work, Kornblith seeks to defend this thesis by attacking what he perceives to be the central alternative: Edward Craig’s “genealogy of knowledge”. As Kornblith sees it, Craig is committed to the view that knowledge is an artificial or social kind. I argue, against Kornblith, (1) that Kornblith’s favoured account of natural kinds —the account developed by Richard Boyd—does not allow for a distinction between natural and social kinds: monarchy, liberalism, and even Napoleon are all natural kinds for Boyd; (2) that Kornblith misunderstands Craig’s genealogy: Craig is not committed to the view that knowledge is not a natural kind; Craig’s account of how the concept of knowledge has developed is compatible with the idea that we often use “knowledge” as a natural kind term; and (3) that Craig’s genealogy is in fact congenial to the general programme of naturalised epistemology.
CITATION STYLE
Kusch, M. (2013). Naturalized Epistemology and the Genealogy of Knowledge. In Studies in History and Philosophy of Science(Netherlands) (Vol. 29, pp. 87–97). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6241-1_6
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