Um Balanço de parte da teoria dos sistemas intencionais de dennett

Abstract

Dennett (1981/1987b) characterizes his approach as to how intentional terms (those for the so called propositional attitudes) work as a "holistic logical behaviorism," or a holistic version of some of Ryle's (1949) conceptualremarks. This paper examines possible contributions and disadvantages of Dennett's approach, as well as the consequencesof this proposal in relation to the employment of intentional terms in psychology. It is argued that Dennett's approachdoes notturn out to be more accurate than his predecessor's, since the mentalistic dimension it adds to the latter is erroneous. Accordingly, Dennett's contributions and related proposal should be understood without the implications of this dimension. A non-mentalistic alternative, based upon Skinner's selectionist model, for eventually adopting intentional terms in psychology is briefly discussed.