The Phenomenology of Agency and Deterministic Agent Causation

Abstract

On one widespread conception, in any situation in which I am deliberating about what to do, I will have a number of distinct options for action or refraining from acting, and these options are genuinely available to me in a sense that requires the absence of causal determination by factors beyond my control. This libertarian conception reflects a core sense of freedom of the will. Some have argued that this ability is reflected in the phenomenology of many of our actions, and thus that the phenomenology of agency might be taken to support the view that we have free will in a libertarian sense. Others have suggested in addition that the phenomenology of agency at least prima facie conflicts with the influential state- or event-causal theory of action, championed by Donald Davidson (J Philos 60:685–700, 1963), among others. The phenomenology appears to reveal that in paradigm cases, actions are caused not solely by events or states, but are rather actively caused by agents themselves. The conclusion one might draw is that the phenomenology supports agent-causal libertarianism. I will argue that the phenomenology does not strongly support a libertarian conception of agency, but that together with further theoretical considerations it does substantiate agent-causation by contrast with state-causation or non-causation of action in paradigm cases of action. In accord with these claims, I explore the sort of compatibilist or determinist agent-causal theory defended by Ned Markosian (Pacific Philos Q 80:257–277, 1999, Philos Stud 157:383–398, 2010) and Dana Nelkin (Making sense of freedom and responsibility. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011).