Social processes in lobbyist agenda development: A longitudinal network analysis of interest groups and legislation

Abstract

How are lobbying agendas formed? While individual interest matters, a social process may also affect why lobbyists choose legislation on which to lobby. In a crowded environment, looking at what credible others do may help lobbyists lower their search and information costs with regard to an issue. Using longitudinal network data on lobbyists' legislative choices, I analyze the choices of organizations using an actor-based dynamic model of network change that conditions agenda changes on the choices made by other organizations. The results suggest both a "bandwagon" process in which organizations converge on "popular" bills and an influence process in which lobbying organizations influence each other when their lobbying agendas overlap. In support of the quantitative findings, interviews with lobbyists show that the policy domain is a social community that consists of ongoing relationships, trust, and information sharing. © 2013 Policy Studies Organization.