Toward a Theory of Empathic Arousal and Development

Abstract

Empathy has long been a topic of interest in psychology, but its nature and development have not been systematically treated. I have for some time been working on a comprehensive theoretical model for empathy, and in this paper, I present the most recent version of this model. Empathy is defined here as a largely involuntary, vicarious response to affective cues from another person or from his situation. The paper includes a discussion of certain definitional issues, followed by a delineation of several different modes of empathic affect arousal. These modes vary in the degree of perceptual and cognitive involvement, the type of stimulus that sets them off (e. g., facial expression, situational cues), the degree to which they are involuntary or subject to conscious control, and the amount and kind of past experiences required. They may also be presumed to become viable and operative at different times developmentally. Empathy is also viewed as having a social-cognitive component arising from the fact that the affect is aroused in one person in response to someone else's situation. The social-cognitive processes, moreover, are assumed to produce a partial transformation of empathy into the related affects of sympathy and guilt. Finally, the motivational component of empathy and the possible role of empathic arousal in prosocial action are discussed. The main focus is on the type of arousal that seems most pertinent to prosocial motivation, the empathic arousal of distress, although I assume that many of my remarks have a bearing on the empathic arousal of other affects as well.