Coase und der schutz vor naturgefahren durch den Wald - eine institutionenökonomische analyse

Abstract

Protection against natural hazards has - like many other forest ecosystem services - public commodity characteristics and is a typical example of the external effects of forest management. However, the legal regulations of its provision differ in Austria and Switzerland. This article thus questions which institutional arrangements for the governance of protective forests exist and which are applied in practice. It describes the problem from an institutional economic perspective according to Coase, analyses in detail the example of Austria, compares it with the Canton of Bern in Switzerland, and draws conclusions and presents recommendations. The results show that the property rights on protection against natural hazards lie with the beneficiaries, but that in both countries the majority of the costs for protective forest management are passed on to the public. Despite the differing legislations, in neither country the costs are borne by the beneficiaries. This is due to the complexity of the ecosystem, the self-interests of the stakeholders, and the specific distribution of power. The "un-bundling" of property rights seems difficult to implement. Alternative institutional arrangements would be such forest management solutions in which most property rights lie in one hand, which would be the case in local joint forest ownership. Leasing, associations, or cooperative solutions would also come close to this ideal.