Abstract
In the present paper we overlay boolean game with norms. Norms distinguish illegal strategies from legal strategies. Two types of legal strategy and legal Nash equilibrium are defined. These two equilibrium are viewed as solution concepts for law abiding agents in norm augmented boolean games. Our formal model is a combination of boolean games and so called input/output logic. We study various complexity issues related to legal strategy and legal Nash equilibrium.
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Sun, X. (2015). Boolean games with norms. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9426, pp. 61–71). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26181-2_6
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