Games with incomplete information

  • Szép J
  • Forgó F
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Abstract

This chapter is devoted to the basic concepts in dynamic games with incomplete in­ formation. As in the case of complete information, Bayesian Nash equilibrium allows players to take suboptimal actions in information sets that are not reached in equilib­ rium. This problem addressed by sequential equilibrium, which explicitly requires that the players play a best reply at every information set (sequential rationality) and that the players' beliefs are "consistent" with the other players' strategies. Here, I will define sequential equilibrium and apply it to some important games.

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Szép, J., & Forgó, F. (1985). Games with incomplete information. In Introduction to the Theory of Games (pp. 370–374). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5193-8_30

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