Abstract
We consider how related-key attacks can be mounted on the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor, and also show that its EDEx multiple mode is far less secure than one could believe. As few as about 232 known plaintexts and related-key known ciphertexts in the first case, and 234 chosen ciphertexts in the second case are required to mount key-recovery attacks. These results show that seemingly academic attacks seriously need to be taken into consideration when it comes to real-life implementations. © Springer-Verlag 2004.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Phan, R. C. W., & Handschuh, H. (2004). On related-key and collision attacks: the case for the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 3225, 111–122. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30144-8_10
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