Layer 2 systems have received increasing attention due to their potential to scale the throughput of L1 blockchains. To avoid the cost of putting data on chain, these systems increasingly turn to off-chain data availability solutions such as data availability committees (DACs). However, placing trust on DACs conflicts with the goal of obtaining an L2 architecture whose security relies solely on the L1 chain. To eliminate such trust assumptions, we propose a DAC protocol that provides financial incentives to deter the DAC nodes from adversarial behavior such as withholding data upon request. We then analyze the interaction of rational DAC nodes and clients as a dynamic game, with a Byzantine adversary that can corrupt and bribe the participants. We also define a notion of optimality for the DAC protocols, inspired by fairness and economic feasibility. Our main result shows that our protocol is optimal and guarantees security with the highest possible probability under reasonable assumptions on the adversary.
CITATION STYLE
Tas, E. N., & Boneh, D. (2024). Cryptoeconomic Security for Data Availability Committees. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 13951, pp. 310–326). Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_18
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