On the economic determinants of prostitution: marriage compensation and unilateral divorce in U.S. states

Abstract

Understanding the determinants of prostitution is key to regulate it. This paper studies the hypothesis that marriage conditions are an economic determinant of female prostitution. I exploit differences in the timing of entry into force of divorce laws across U.S. states to explore the effect of such laws on arrests of female prostitutes. Using a difference-in-difference design, I find that unilateral divorce leads to a reduction of female arrested prostitutes between 5–10%. Results are consistent with the notion that improving marriage opportunities can be a powerful force to deter entry into prostitution for a subset of the population who is inframarginal. Lack of alternatives are key to explain the choice to conduct this activity. To this extent, this work is part of a broader research agenda hinting at improvements in gender equality as a mean for tapering off female prostitution.