In Kant’s moral theory we find a close connection between the concept of human dignity and the prohibition to use people merely as means. My chapter follows Kant in tracing this connection. But in contrast to Kant, for whom the prohibition to use people covers the whole range of perfect duties, I present an account of using people that seems to be closer to our common sense understanding in that it only covers a limited range of such duties. I will argue that, nevertheless, we need the concept of human dignity to explain why it is at least prima facie wrong to use people merely as means. The peculiar work that the concept of human dignity fulfills in explaining the wrongness of these acts does not consist in making them wrong directly. The concept of human dignity is rather necessary to explain how certain other properties can make acts wrong. By applying the concept of human dignity to the case of using people, we not only become able to explain the wrongness of using, but we also see that the concept of human dignity does play an important role in moral philosophy as a whole.
CITATION STYLE
Kaufmann, P. (2011). Instrumentalization: What Does It Mean to Use a Person? In Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy (Vol. 24, pp. 57–65). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9661-6_5
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.