This paper questions the widespread supposition that artefact kinds are kinds of artefacts. I will argue that this supposition rests on a one-sided diet of examples taken from inanimate physical things and the neglect of social and biological artefacts. I will argue that belonging to an artefact kind and being an artefact are independent features: The first divides off artefacts from non-artefacts, the second rests on the distinction between instances of artefact kinds and instances of natural kinds. I claim that these two distinctions are orthogonal to each other, and besides the two canonical combinations of artificial instances of artefact kinds and nonartificial instances of natural kinds there are also non-artificial instances of artefact kinds and artificial instances of natural kinds. Moreover, as some artificial living beings are self-reproducing, some instances of an artefact kind are not themselves artefacts. Hence artefact kinds are not of necessity kinds of artefacts.
CITATION STYLE
Jansen, L. (2013). Artefact kinds need not be kinds of artefacts. In Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on his Seventieth Birthday (pp. 317–337). Walter de Gruyter GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110322507.317
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