Economic incentive structure for blockchain network

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Abstract

Traditionally the transactions need middleman or the third-party to keep them trustworthy. However, the middleman itself may be the bottleneck of the trust model. When all the transactions are dealt with by the third parties, these third parties may not be trustworthy any more. Blockchain is proposed to eliminate the third parties of the transactions, which will make the trading parties of the transactions “face to face”. Though blockchain can provide the potential solution, it is still in rapid progress. At present, blockchain technology has been widely used to provide reliable transaction support. But the application mechanism is too complex and the demand for high concurrency is strong in some specific industries. This paper introduces a delegated parliament, which is selected from the unified node, whose role is to unite different blockchains and adjust the economic system of the network within a single chain, automatically form a decentralized marked financial market and an economy consensus law that complies with community laws and regulations. This structure is used in Unitary blockchain network, which provides the proof of its efficiency.

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APA

Sheng, H., Fan, X., Hu, W., Liu, X., & Zhang, K. (2018). Economic incentive structure for blockchain network. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11373 LNCS, pp. 120–128). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05764-0_13

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