Let's talk about the interregnum: Gramsci and the crisis of the liberal world order

Abstract

The liberal international order (LIO) is in crisis. The near-collapse of the global financial system in 2008; the emergence of 'statist' economies (especially the BRIC(S) states) as a counter-model; the rise of right-wing movements across Europe and the United States since the crisis; the Brexit vote and Trump's election in 2016-these are just the most obvious signs.1 All these events challenge the various pillars of the LIO, from institutions of global governance to economic openness or multilateral trade and security cooperation.2 Few scholars and commentators would deny that the LIO currently faces the greatest and deepest challenge since its establishment after the Second World War.3 Two core questions accompany this diagnosis: Is there a possibility of 'renewal and reorganization' to save the LIO for the future? 4 And: What comes next? Authors who engage with the first question usually tend to accentuate the merits of the LIO and its role in building and maintaining a relatively stable, cooperative and prosperous order.5 Most of those who address the second question are concerned with the rise of China as a rival superpower to challenge US hegemony.6 The two questions have different temporal perspectives: while the first looks to the past and the history of the LIO to formulate conclusions about its fitness to meet present challenges, the second is clearly orientated towards the future. And yet, while both perspectives raise key questions about the past and the future of world order, there is an analytical blind spot in the discussions about the LIO: we lack an analysis of the nature of the crisis itself as it unfolds. By that I mean a comprehensive account that brings together the various different strands and dimensions of a crisis of world order that amounts to more than the sum of its parts. How can we describe and analyse the crisis as a crisis and not only as the period between what is eroding (the LIO) and what will emerge instead (a future world order)? This article proposes an answer by outlining an analytical framework drawing on three Gramscian concepts related to crisis-processuality, organicity and morbidity. I argue that these elements capture conceptually three dimensions that are crucial to a comprehensive understanding of the crisis of the LIO: the global political economy, the state level and societal dimensions. This framework does not itself provide an overarching and definitive analysis of the crisis, but rather establishes the basis for a research programme that can help to move beyond the isolated analyses of various dimensions of the crisis to a more encompassing assessment.