In this book, leading experts in international negotiations present formal models of conflict resolution and international negotiations. Besides the description of different models and approaches, the book answers three questions: How can the abstract concepts and results of rational choice theorists be made more understandable and plausible to political and social scientists not trained to work with formal models? What can be done to encourage practitioners to use not only simple but also mathematically advanced approaches in their analysis of real world negotiation problems? How can practitioners (e.g., politicians and diplomats) become interested in, take into account, and apply formal models of their more important problems? © International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 2007. All rights are reserved.
CITATION STYLE
Avenhaus, R., & Zartman, I. W. (2007). Diplomacy games: Formal models and international negotiations. Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations (pp. 1–350). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9
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