Democracy-coated authoritarianism: How federalism may act as a cover for undemocratic governments

Abstract

It is commonly accepted that, by protecting the autonomy of federal units, federalism creates the institutional room for innovation and protection of diversity. Less often acknowledged is the fact that governmental autonomy of federal units may also provide protection for undemocratic practices within otherwise democratic countries. Ordinarily, these undemocratic practices are blended with conservative, right-wing policies, which are largely detrimental to the interests of the majorities. This paper shows how political parties and interested actors within federal units may use the very mechanisms provided by federalism to distort accepted political and legal practices to their advantage. They are able to brush aside objections about breaches to democratic principles, law, and custom by largely claiming that the respect to governmental autonomy of their federal units is at stake. Using the province of Alberta, Canada, as a central case study, this paper also draws theoretical insights from examples in other federal jurisdictions. The paper aims to contribute to the theory and general reflection on the downsides of federal governance, and the need to implement institutional limits on them.