On pure Nash equilibria in stochastic games

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Abstract

Ummels andWojtczak initiated the study of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multi-player games satisfying specific bounds. They showed that deciding the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (pureNE) where a fixed player wins almost surely is undecidable for games with 9 players. They also showed that the problem remains undecidable for the finite-strategy Nash equilibrium (finNE) with 14 players. In this paper we improve their undecidability results by showing that pureNE and finNE problems remain undecidable for 5 or more players.

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Das, A., Krishna, S. N., Manasa, L., Trivedi, A., & Wojtczak, D. (2015). On pure Nash equilibria in stochastic games. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9076, pp. 359–371). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17142-5_31

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