In this brief announcement we present our ongoing work to localize “false data injection” (FDI) attacks on the system state of modern power systems, better known as smart grids. Because of their exceptional importance for our society and together with the increasing presence of information and telecommunication (ICT) components, these power systems are a vulnerable target for cyber attacks. In our method, we represent the power system as a graph and use a generalized modulation operator that is applied on the states of the system. Our preliminary results indicate that attacked grid states exhibit specific modulation patterns that facilitate the localization of the attacks on the particular buses of the grid. This approach is demonstrated by several case study simulations.
CITATION STYLE
Drayer, E., & Routtenberg, T. (2019). Cyber attack localization in smart grids by graph modulation. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11527 LNCS, pp. 97–100). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20951-3_8
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.