We present an economic model of greenwash, in which a firm strategically discloses environmental information and a non-governmental organization (NGO) may audit and penalize the firm for failing to fully disclose its environmental impacts. We show that disclosures increase when the likelihood of good environmental performance is lower. Firms with intermediate levels of environmental performance are more likely to engage in greenwash. Under certain conditions, NGO punishment of greenwash induces the firm to become less rather than more forthcoming about its environmental performance. We also show that complementarities with NGO auditing may justify public policies encouraging firms to adopt en- vironmental management systems.
CITATION STYLE
Walker, E. T. (2022). Astroturf Lobbying. In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs (pp. 51–53). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44556-0_63
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