Selection by committee

14Citations
Citations of this article
1Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text

Abstract

The many-player game of selling an asset, introduced by Sakaguchi and extended to monotone voting procedures by Yasuda, Nakagami and Kurano, is reviewed. Conditions for a unique equilibrium among stationary threshold strategies are given.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Ferguson, T. S. (2005). Selection by committee. In Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Vol. 7, pp. 203–209). Birkhauser. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-8176-4429-6_10

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free