Judicial independence in transition: Revisiting the determinants of judicial activism in the constitutional courts of post-communist states

Abstract

This study investigates the relationship between dimensions of judicial independence and judicial review in constitutional courts Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. In part a modified replication of prior works examining the issue, the study uses newly collected data from a panel of ten countries. It examines the relationship of judicial review with: (1) judicial independence (using both measures employed by the prior works, corrected versions of those measures, and measures original to this study); (2) political and social contextual factors; and (3) the receptiveness of post-communist countries to the importation of transplanted legal institutions. Improvements on the conceptualisation of judicial independence, inclusion of the dimensions of receptiveness, and a more appropriate panel of countries enable this study to present a more complete and accurate portrait of constitutional judicature in transition contexts. The results show that while corrections to prior measures of judicial independence improve the results at the margin, the entirely new measures of the concept represent a greater step forward. Several dimensions of judicial independence are positively related to judicial review, as are the measures of countries receptiveness to legal transplants. Other key factors positively related to judicial review in transition include legislative fragmentation at the time of each court decision, the scope of rights guarantees in a bill of rights, and popular trust in courts. Presidential power is negatively related to judicial review. The findings further indicate that aside from judicial independence, the prior works do present correct portrayals of most of the contextual influences they investigate. © 2008 Akadémiai Kiadó.